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Parental Responsibility and Removal of Life Sustaining Treatment:  
Re Baby D 
 
The case of Re Baby D (No. 2) [2011] FamCA 176 (6 Mar 2011) has been 
described as a “landmark decision” as to whether parents themselves can 
authorise medical staff to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from their child or 
are required to seek the permission of a court or tribunal.1 
 
Baby D was one of a set of twins, born at twenty-seven weeks gestation. Both 
initially required respiratory support, due to complications arising from their 
premature birth.  The other twin was eventually able to breathe unassisted, 
however, Baby D continued to require artificial support.  The procedure known 
as ‘endotracheal intubation’ was used and involved a tube being inserted 
through the mouth down into the trachea, to assist to ventilate the lungs.   
The Family Court case in question concerned an application by the parents of 
Baby D for a declaration that they be authorised to consent on behalf of their 
child to medical staff at the treating hospital removing and not replacing the 
endotracheal tube from her airway.  There was evidence that prolonged 
insertion of the tube had led to the development of an upper airway obstruction, 
due to inflammation and narrowing of the larynx, and that this was a well 
recognised complication of prolonged endotracheal intubation.  The respondent 
to the parents’ application was the treating hospital, the child was represented 
by an independent children’s lawyer and the Office of the Public Advocate 
appeared by way of Amicus Curiae. 
 
                                                            
1 ABC Radio, The Law Report, Baby D, Transcript of Interview of Cameron Stewart, 
Associate Professor and Director of the Centre for Health Goverance, Law and Ethics at the 
University of Sydney, by Damien Carrick, 22 March 2011 at 5 
<http://www.abc.net.au/rn/lawreport/stories/2011/3169433.htm> viewed  
The medical evidence was that it was unlikely that Baby D would be able to 
breathe once the tube was removed, and that the proposed removal was sought 
with the expectation that it would not be replaced in the event that life- 
threatening airway obstruction developed and that palliative medication should 
then be administered to relieve the child’s pain and distress. There was clear 
evidence that Baby D had previously suffered a severe brain injury. This had 
occurred as a result of medical staff removing the tube when they had believed 
that she had reached the point of being able to breathe unassisted. Unfortunately 
this was not the case and there had been a thirty-five minute period during 
which staff struggled to re-insert the tube, during which time it was thought that 
the child’s brain had been starved of oxygen and suffered irreversible damage. 
 
Young J initially considered whether the Family Court had jurisdiction to 
consider a case where parents were seeking authorisation to withdraw medical 
treatment.  His Honour held that the Family Court did have jurisdiction in such 
an area under its “welfare” jurisdiction in section 67ZC of the Family Law Act 
1975 (Cth), although he noted that section 69ZH limits the Court’s power to 
make such orders to “a child of a marriage”.  This requirement was satisfied as 
Baby D was a child of the marriage of his parents.  In considering what orders 
to make under section 67ZC, Young J was required to “regard the best interests 
of the child as the paramount consideration”.2 
The next question was whether the proposed removal of the endotracheal tube 
fell within the spectrum of medical procedure scenarios where parents 
themselves cannot authorise medical treatment and court or tribunal 
authorisation is required.   Re Baby D is the most recent in a long line of cases 
that courts have considered over recent years concerning major decisions in 
relation to medical treatment for children.  Other cases have concerned issues 
                                                            
2 Family Law Act, s67ZC(2). 
such as the proposed sterilisation of an intellectually disabled girl, medical 
procedures relating to gender identity and the bone marrow harvest of a child to 
assist a gravely ill relative.   
In the landmark decision of Marion’s Case, the parents were proposing that 
their fourteen year old intellectually disabled daughter be sterilised.3 The court 
considered that such a procedure was a “special medical procedure” as it was 
both invasive and irreversible and was proposed, not for the primary purpose of 
treating a malfunction or disease, but for social and hygiene reasons.  The High 
Court stated: 
As a starting point, sterilization requires invasive, irreversible and major surgery. But so do, 
for example, an appendectomy and some cosmetic surgery, both of which, in our opinion, 
come within the ordinary scope of a parent to consent to. However, other factors exist which 
have the combined effect of marking out the decision to authorize sterilization as a special 
case. Court authorization is required, first, because of the significant risk of making the 
wrong decision, either as to a child’s present or future capacity to consent or about what are 
the best interests of a child who cannot consent, and secondly, because the consequences of a 
wrong decision are particularly grave.4 
The present case of Baby D involved circumstances where both parents and 
medical staff were all in agreement about what medical course would be in the 
best interests of the child.  There was also clear evidence that the child had 
sustained a severe brain injury and would, even if she survived the removal of 
the endotracheal tube, have a very poor quality of life.  Young J expressed the 
view that, in such circumstances, the law should only intervene when absolutely 
necessary.  He stated that: 
In my view, the law should tread very lightly in seeking to intrude in, or impose itself upon, 
those decisions. It would in my respectful view be sad indeed if the courtroom was to replace 
a caring, holistic environment within which approach by parents and doctors alike could deal 
with (admittedly extremely difficult) medical and other decisions that need to be made [195].  
                                                            
3 (1992) 175 CLR 218 at 236 to 239. 
4 Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218 at 250. 
Young J reviewed the many authorities in this area to determine if the proposed 
withdrawal of treatment fell within the categories of “special medical 
procedures” or “special cases” and therefore required court authorisation.  His 
Honour distinguished the facts of the present case from that of Marion’s Case  
and was of the view that the proposed medical procedure, to remove the 
endotracheal tube, was primarily for the treatment of a bodily malfunction or 
disease, namely to remedy Baby D’s upper airway obstruction.  He stated: 
Although the procedure of extubation may be invasive, it was very clear from the evidence of 
Doctors X and Y that both practitioners considered extubation a routine medical procedure as 
opposed to a procedure involving major or irreversible surgery. Further, both practitioners 
strongly emphasised that they did not consider extubation to be a “special medical procedure” 
as defined in the Rules. Similarly, the foreshadowed procedure of administering medication, 
sedation or palliative care, based on the evidence of Doctors X and Y, does not involve 
invasive or major irreversible surgery [228].  
 
There are a number of distinguishing features between the procedure in Marion’s Case and 
the procedure(s) proposed in the matter of Baby D. The medical procedure of extubation and 
the foreshadowed administering of palliative care, sedation or medication in the current 
circumstances are for the treatment of a bodily malfunction or disease, namely Baby D’s 
upper airway obstruction. My respectful conclusion is that, in the particular factual context of 
this matter, this places the procedures within the ambit of parental responsibility as 
procedures that relate to major long-term issues in respect of the health of Baby D and her 
care, welfare and development per s 64B(2)(i) of the Act [229].  
 
His Honour also had regard to the definition of a “Medical Procedure 
Application” in the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) being an application “seeking 
an order authorising a major medical procedure for a child that is not for the 
purpose of treating a bodily malfunction or disease”.  The examples of “major 
medical procedures” were for procedures for the sterilization or removal of a 
child’s reproductive organs.5 
His Honour concluded that the parents of Baby D could themselves have 
authorised staff at the hospital to withdraw the tube as such a decision fell 
                                                            
5 For the procedural requirements in relation to such applications see Family Law Rules, rules 
4.08-4.12. 
within the range of their parental responsibility powers pursuant to sections 61B 
and 61C of the Family Law Act.  In this context parents are authorised to make 
both day to day and major long-term decisions6 in relation to their children, 
including those in relation to health.  Young J, however, acknowledged that in 
this case the parents had asked the court for guidance in relation to this issue 
and accordingly the court could make orders within the realms of its power to 
make parenting orders in relation to parental responsibility, pursuant to section 
64B(2)(i).7  His Honour made detailed orders including: 
 
THAT the parents (the mother and father of Baby D) are permitted to authorise 
and give consent on behalf of their child to the hospital and its staff and medical 
practitioners: 
(a) first to remove and not replace the endotracheal tube from the airway of 
Baby D; and  
(b) secondly and if Baby D is in pain or develops respiratory distress or collapse 
suffered as a consequence of the removal or absence of the endotracheal tube, 
then to provide palliative care and administer such sedation or other medication 
as is necessary and proper. 
 
In this case it was significant that the parents, medical staff and independent 
children’s lawyer were all in agreement in relation to the proposed withdrawal 
of treatment.  It was also significant that Baby D had sustained a significant 
brain injury and that there was extensive medical evidence to support this. 
Young J provided the qualification that “[o]ther similar medical procedures 
within a different factual context may require court authorisation”[at 232].  The 
case is therefore not a general authority for the proposition that parents can 
generally authorise the withdrawal of treatment, such as the removal of an 
endotracheal tube from their child, but is limited to the particular factual 
                                                            
6 See the definition of “major long-term issues” in Family Law Act, s4. 
7 Young J also noted that the court alternatively had power to make the orders under its 
welfare power pursuant to section 67ZC of the Family Law Act. 
circumstances of the case, including that the removal of the tube was to treat “a 
bodily malfunction or disease”, being Baby D’s upper airway obstruction. 
 
 
